Fisheries enforcement missions

IUU fishing costs coastal states billions in lost licence revenue and stock collapse. A national fisheries surveillance constellation replaces random patrols with cueing intelligence derived from your own sensors, in your own jurisdiction.

The dependence this ends: Patrol vessels chasing an empty ocean

The ocean is large. Your patrol budget is not.

Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing is not a peripheral problem. The FAO estimates IUU fishing accounts for up to 26 million tonnes of catch annually, a figure that erodes both fish stocks and the licence revenues coastal states depend on to fund the very enforcement meant to stop it. For small island developing states and nations with extended exclusive economic zones, the arithmetic is brutal: the EEZ may span hundreds of thousands of square kilometres; the patrol fleet may consist of two or three vessels.

The standard response has been to buy more sea days. That is the wrong unit of measurement. Sea days spent searching are sea days not spent intercepting. What changes the equation is intelligence: knowing where vessels are, which ones have switched off their AIS transponders, and which closed areas are being worked before the catch is landed and the evidence dispersed. Space-based sensors produce that intelligence continuously, at a cost per square kilometre of coverage that no patrol vessel can match.

What the sensors actually see, and where they fall short

Three sensor types combine to characterise the dark fleet problem. Space-based AIS receivers detect the transponder broadcasts that cooperative vessels transmit; gap analysis then flags vessels that were broadcasting in your EEZ and subsequently went silent, a behaviour pattern strongly associated with entry into closed or restricted areas. C-band synthetic aperture radar detects vessel-sized radar cross-sections regardless of whether a transponder is active, day or night, through most cloud cover. RF signal-mapping payloads detect radio emissions from fishing vessels, including communications and navigation radars, providing a third independent detection layer that does not rely on cooperative behaviour at all.

Candour matters here. SAR at the resolutions achievable on small satellites (typically 3 to 20 metres depending on mode and platform) will detect vessels reliably but cannot always discriminate a trawler from a cargo ship without corroborating data. AIS gap analysis generates leads, not convictions; a transponder failure is not the same as deliberate deactivation. RF detection localises emissions but attribution requires cross-referencing with other layers. The value of the system is the fusion of all three, producing a prioritised intercept list rather than a definitive manifest of offenders. Patrol vessels still board, inspect and prosecute. The satellite layer tells them where to go.

The ambition ladder: from first data to sovereign enforcement capability

A pathfinder mission is a single 6U cubesat carrying a space-based AIS receiver, launched into a low Earth orbit that provides regular passes over the EEZ of interest. It proves the data pipeline, trains the first analyst cohort, and establishes the ground station and processing infrastructure. Small-satellite AIS missions of this class have publicly reported budgets in the low tens of millions of dollars; the ORBCOMM and Spire commercial AIS constellations, whose published business cases are on record, give a sense of the economics at scale. A pathfinder does not replace commercial AIS data subscriptions immediately; it runs alongside them, building the institutional capacity to interpret and act on the feed.

An operational constellation adds SAR and RF payloads across multiple satellites, raising revisit frequency over the EEZ from occasional to operationally useful, typically multiple passes per day over high-priority areas. The number of satellites required depends on the size of the zone and the revisit interval the enforcement authority needs; a three-to-five satellite constellation covering a mid-sized EEZ is a reasonable planning assumption for the operational tier. Programmes of this scale and complexity, drawing on published analogues from national remote-sensing initiatives, typically run three to five years from contract to full operational capability and require sustained operational budgets for ground infrastructure, mission control and data processing thereafter.

What you own at handover, and what the limits are

The programme is structured so that the enforcement authority ends the contract holding real assets, not a subscription. That means satellites in orbit with source-access terms agreed before signature, a licensed and auditable ground station on national territory, in-country processing software with full documentation, and a trained national team capable of running daily operations without external dependency. Hardware audit rights are built into the contract structure, not added as an afterthought.

The limits are worth stating plainly. Satellites in low Earth orbit have finite design lives, typically five to seven years for small platforms; a sustainability plan for replenishment is part of any serious programme architecture, not an optional extra. Cloud cover does not defeat SAR but it does affect optical confirmation of detections. Revisit gaps of several hours remain between passes even in a small constellation; a vessel can move a significant distance in that window. The system produces enforcement intelligence, not enforcement. The legal and operational chain from detection to prosecution remains entirely the responsibility of the national authority.

From intercept list to court-admissible evidence

The data chain matters as much as the sensors. In-country processing means detections are analysed on national infrastructure, reducing the risk that sensitive operational patterns are visible to foreign commercial providers. Fusion of AIS, SAR and RF layers produces a ranked list of vessels warranting attention, with timestamps, coordinates and confidence levels. That output is formatted for the patrol coordination centre, not for a data scientist.

Prosecution requires a chain of custody that courts will accept. Satellite imagery and AIS records have been admitted as evidence in IUU prosecutions in multiple jurisdictions; the key requirements are metadata integrity, documented processing steps and independent corroboration. Building those requirements into the data architecture from the start, rather than retrofitting them after the first arrest, is the difference between an enforcement tool and a research project.

What this mission is built from

Space-based AIS receivers: Detects AIS transponder broadcasts across the EEZ and feeds gap-analysis algorithms to flag vessels that have gone dark.
C-band SAR payloads: Provides all-weather, day-and-night vessel detection in closed areas regardless of transponder status.
RF signal-mapping payloads: Detects radio and radar emissions from fishing vessels operating without AIS, providing a third independent detection layer.
6U CubeSat platforms: Hosts AIS and RF payloads on the pathfinder satellite, keeping the entry-level programme within a budget range that allows early deployment.
In-country data processing: Fuses AIS, SAR and RF detections on national infrastructure and outputs a prioritised intercept list for the patrol coordination centre.

What you end up owning

One or more satellites in orbit, with source-access terms and hardware audit rights documented in the contract
A licensed ground station on national territory capable of tasking satellites and downlinking data
In-country data processing software with full technical documentation and no ongoing licence dependency on Satellize
A trained national operations team qualified to run mission control, data fusion and patrol cueing without external support
The complete data archive of detections, with metadata integrity suitable for evidentiary use
Spectrum and orbital slot registrations filed in the customer's name through ITU processes

Handover is staged across the programme: ground station operations transfer to the national team during the operational phase, not at the end of it. Mission control procedures, software source code and training materials are delivered under the contract before final acceptance. After handover, Satellize retains no operational role; optional support arrangements for satellite health monitoring or constellation replenishment planning are negotiated separately and are not a condition of the original contract.

Programme parameters

Pathfinder configuration	1 x 6U cubesat with AIS and RF payloads; 1 ground station; 1 processing node
Operational constellation	3 to 5 satellites mixing AIS, SAR and RF payloads depending on EEZ size and revisit requirement
Target orbit	Low Earth orbit, 450 to 600 km altitude, inclination matched to EEZ latitude band
Revisit over EEZ (pathfinder)	2 to 4 passes per day over a mid-latitude zone; coverage gaps of 4 to 8 hours typical
Revisit over EEZ (constellation)	Multiple passes per day; high-priority sub-areas coverable at sub-4-hour intervals with 5+ satellites
SAR vessel detection floor	Vessels approximately 10 metres and larger detectable; discrimination from non-fishing traffic requires data fusion
Pathfinder timeline	18 to 30 months from contract to first data, dependent on launch slot availability
Operational constellation timeline	3 to 5 years from contract to full operational capability
National team to operate	Minimum 4 to 6 trained operators for a pathfinder; 10 to 15 for a multi-satellite constellation with 24-hour watch
Satellite design life	5 to 7 years for small platforms; replenishment planning recommended from programme outset

Sources

One contract, one accountable engineer

Commissioned as one programme, not a stack of contracts: spacecraft, launch, ground segment, mission control, training and handover are priced together. Source-access terms and audit rights are agreed in writing before signature. Request an EEZ coverage assessment.