Every satellite a nation operates is exposed to collision risk from the roughly 35,000 tracked objects above 10 cm and an estimated 1 million fragments too small for ground-based radar to catalogue reliably. A conjunction event — two objects passing within dangerous proximity — can escalate from probability spike to unavoidable impact in under 72 hours. Without an independent assessment capability, a space-operating nation is dependent on the US 18th Space Defense Squadron's public CDMs, which carry no service-level guarantee, are deliberately degraded for foreign operators, and go silent the moment the US classifies an event.
A sovereign conjunction-assessment architecture combines space-based optical and radar surveillance with ground-based phased-array tracking to generate independent state vectors and probability-of-collision (Pc) estimates. The satellite layer — a constellation of electro-optical and RF-ranging microsats in complementary LEO planes — provides in-situ observations of resident space objects that ground radar misses, particularly in the 1–10 cm regime that sits below current TLE catalogue thresholds. Fusing these observations with a national high-fidelity orbit determination pipeline closes the loop from detection to manoeuvre recommendation without any foreign intermediary.
The operational payoff is manoeuvre autonomy. A national space operations centre that generates its own Pc values, tracks its own conjunction timelines and issues its own manoeuvre advisories can protect its satellite fleet on its own schedule, share data selectively with allies, and credibly argue treaty compliance during a disputed event. It also gives the nation standing in multilateral STM forums — you cannot negotiate rules you do not have the instruments to enforce.